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Wholesale Peak Demand Pricing 
A Comparison of Coincidental and Non-Coincidental Peak Based Demand Charges on 
Wholesale Full-Requirements Customers of Bonneville Power Administration 
By Jarek R Hunger 
 
 Most public utilities get to set their own power rates, subject to regulation. For many customers, 
this power rate is priced based on the quantity of energy taken. In addition, pricing based on the time of 
use is becoming more common. Renewable energy is changing the landscape for power utilities. It is 
reducing the market price of energy, especially during times of high solar and wind generation. Since 
utilities still need to recover their costs, new pricing structures are needed. A method of pricing that some 
utilities use, which is getting more attention now that larger amounts of renewable generation are coming 
online, is a charge for the peak amount of energy consumed over some time interval. 
 A utility needs to have a generation and transmission system ready to serve the highest level of 
load incurred at any time. To give a simplified example, if a customer uses 1 MW most of the time and 
then peaks at 100 MW for a single hour, the utility must build a system which can serve 100 MW. Under 
a simple time of use pricing scheme, the cost of having 99 MW on standby most of the time is being 
divided over many customers, even if their loads are a flat 10 MW all hours. Since the utility must recover 
its costs this means that the other customers with flatter loads pay a higher rate than they should have to, 
based on how much cost they are incurring on the system. This also means that customers with flatter 
loads subsidize customers with peaky loads; weakening the price signal they receive to flatten their loads. 
The purpose of a demand charge is two-fold.  First, it allocates the higher cost of a peaky load to 
those customers with peaky loads. Second, it creates the incentive for customers to flatten their loads by 
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encouraging demand response during peak energy use periods. If this second goal is realized it will result 
in lower total costs on the utility since their system will not need to support as high of a peak. This will 
cause lower energy rates for all customers (all else equal) since the utility will have a lower total cost to 
recover through energy rates. 
Currently, there are two methods of evaluating demand charges. The first and most popular 
method is to charge customers based on their electricity load during the utility’s peak electricity usage – 
called coincident peak pricing. This is intuitive because the utility’s system peak determines the 
maximum level of demand they must be ready to serve in terms of generating the peak level of power and 
having the transmission to serve it. Through this mechanism the utility can directly pass through the price 
signal related to acquiring additional generating and transmission capacity. The problem with this method 
is that customers are left guessing when the peak might occur. If a customer is unsure of when the system 
peak will occur, they are similarly unsure if any actions they take to reduce their load during that time will 
be worth taking. 
This problem has long been in the utility industry. In 2011 Bonneville Power Administration 
(BPA) enacted demand rates which base demand charges on what is called non-coincident peaks. This 
method bases the demand charge on the individual customer’s peak load, not their load during the 
system’s peak. The downside to this method is that it sends an imperfect price signal to customers whose 
peak is different than the system peak, since they are being incentivized to reduce their peak during an 
hour that is not BPA’s peak. However, since BPA’s peak is an aggregation of customer usage, if all 
customer peaks go down, BPA’s system peak should go down as well. The benefit of non-coincident 
pricing is primarily that it gives the customer much more agency over their demand charge since it is 
based on something they can potentially control. This concern for customer agency was the primary 
motivation for BPA to move to non-coincident peak pricing (Bonneville Power Administration, 2008). As 
such, the question that this thesis seeks to evaluate is whether this change results in larger system-wide 
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benefits due to customers being more invested in reducing their peak. This will be tested by looking at the 
results of BPA’s methodology change in 2011. 
This thesis is from the perspective of a public utility, as opposed to an investor-owned utility, 
since it is a study of the Bonneville Power Administration. This means that power rates will be discussed 
as a mechanism to recover costs and not to generate a profit. Insofar as a “profit” appears to exist, it will 
simply represent an over collection of monies which will be “returned” to rate payers in the form of 
lowered power rates in the future. 
Literature Review 
As of today there has never been an apples-to-apples comparison of non-coincident demand 
charges to coincident demand charges and their comparative effectiveness. Since demand charges are 
relatively new for many utilities the discussion has centered around whether they are worth implementing 
at all, and if so, how (Rocky Moutain Institute, 2016). Demand charges for residential customers is a topic 
of increasing interest, recently, as the technology has developed to a level where residential demand 
charges are feasible (Faruqui, The Economics of Dynamic Pricing and Smart Metering, 2006).  
While there has been a substantial amount of work done quantifying the load impacts of various 
demand charges this work has mostly been done outside of traditional peer-reviewed research in the form 
of company reports or white papers. In addition, most of this research is on power sales at the retail-level 
as opposed to at the wholesale-level. No work has analyzed utility incentive to reduce peakyness outside 
of the regulated retail setting. 
The impact of both demand charges and time of use rates was first investigated in the 1990’s. One 
example is Taylor and Schwarz in 1990 which investigated the long run effects of the time of use rate 
offered by Duke Power (Taylor & Schwarz, 1990). They found that time of use rates had increasing 
effects over time that made them more effective than originally expected at reducing peak usage. 
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Subsequently, a few different studies have been conducted which evaluated the effect of various 
types of demand charges. Wolak in 2007 studied the effect of critical peak pricing (a demand charge) for 
123 customers of City of Anaheim Public Utilities and found a load reduction of about 12 percent during 
declared peak times (Wolak, Residential Customer Response to Real-Time Pricing, 2007). Wolak did 
another study in 2010 which looked at the effect of demand charges compared to demand rebates and 
found an aggregate effect of about 12.43 percent (Wolak, An Experimental Comparison of Critical Peak 
and Hourly Pricing, 2010). Probably the most authoritative study currently was done by Baltimore Gas 
and Electric Company in 2008 and 2009. They had about 1000 customers who were randomly placed with 
either critical peak pricing or peak time rebates. Some of these customers were then paired with 
technology to help them communicate peaks as well as give customers control over usage. They found a 
peak reduction range of 18 to 33 percent for each of the summers (Faruqui & Sergici, Dynamic pricing of 
electricity in the mid-Atlantic region, 2011). 
All of these studies have been focused on residential use impact – not wholesale customers. The 
Rocky Mountain Institute points out there is, “comparatively little industry experience with mass-market 
demand charges relative to time-based rates” (Rocky Moutain Institute, 2016). They also acknowledge 
that there is little empirical evidence to provide insight on the impact of demand charges beyond cost 
recovery. This is especially true with regards to wholesale customers. 
As such, this study seeks to provide some new evidence on the comparative effects of two 
different types of demand charges as well as provide some estimates of the overall effect. BPA’s demand 
charge is a good candidate for testing the impact of non-coincident demand charges compared to 
coincident demand charges because most aspects of their demand charge stayed the same throughout the 
period. Before and after 2011 the demand charge was ex post (applied based on when the peak ended up 
being after the fact), based on the peak average hour each month, and collected roughly the same amount 
of overall revenue (Bonneville Power Administration, 2012). Given the lack of research, this is a prime 
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opportunity for investigation. Principally I want to show how this new rate structure affected customer 
loads during BPA’s system peak. 
Methodology 
Many of BPAs customers are not subject to the demand charge due to their product choice, are 
inconsistently effected, or were not customers during the whole time period. In particular, BPA offers a 
product called “Slice” which allows customers to pay for a percentage of the system’s costs and receive a 
percentage of the system’s output. Since the Slice product is not tied to load shape, Slice customers are 
not subject to a demand charge since they pay for a portion of the system costs, and do not effect BPA’s 
need to expand the system.  As such I used the 91 of 116 customers which were customer’s during the 
whole period and have their entire loads provided by BPA (a list of customers is included in appendix 2). 
These customers represent total load of a little more than 20,000 gigawatt hours per year. 
In order to test the impact of the non-coincident demand pricing I created a model of system peaks 
(GSPs) in Kilowatts (KW) including as regressors: total electricity usage (TRL) in Kilowatt-Hours, the 
electricity rate for heavy load hours (HLH PF Rate) in Dollars per Megawatt-Hour, the demand rate in 
Dollars per Killowatt, the extremeness of weather (explained in Appendix 3), and the sum of the 
population of Oregon and Washington. Additionally, I included dummy variables for the months of the 
year and a time trend. The model was estimated using data from January 2002 to September 2011, 
approximately ten years before the change in pricing structure and during which coincident peak demand 
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1st 




The sum of customer 
loads during BPA's 
system peak In MW 1966008 2427478 2699859 2757837 3037307 4489010 
SUMTRL 
The sum of customer 
loads during the 
month In KWh 1328912257 1508973771 1609373295 1655830842 1743219547 2243862182 
HLHPF Rate 
The "Priority Firm" 
energy rate during 
heavy load hours 
In 
$/MWh 12.53 21.03 28.47 26.86 32.59 41.55 
Demand Rate 
The demand rate 
paid as described in 
this paper 
In 
$/KW 0.75 1.43 2.03 3.53 2.31 11.47 
Weather 
Extremeness 
The weather metric 
which is described in 
appendix 3* * 56.26 90.95 247.22 281.19 462.87 658.81 
SUMPop 
The sum of the 
populations of 
Oregon, Idaho, and 
Washington 
In 
people 10906145 11298748 11865299 11787149 12274401 12667196 
 
Graphs of these data sets over the time period are included in appendix 6. Population is a steadily 
increasing variable and is calculated as the sum of the populations of Oregon, Idaho, and Washington. 
Weather extremeness is a seasonal variable which is calculated as the average sum of degree-hours 
outside of 65-75 degrees Fahrenheit, it is described in more detail in appendix 3. The demand rate is a 
seasonal variable which increased substantially in 2011 when the rate structure was changed. The HLH 
PF Energy rate is a seasonal variable which increased substantially in 2011 as well when the rate structure 











The fit of the model to the real data is shown below, where the blue line is the fitted values and the 
red line is the real values. Several assumption testing plots are included in Appendix 4. 
 
This estimated model was then given input data for October 2011 to September 2014 to generate 
estimated GSPs for those time periods. Since the model was generated using data from before the rate 
structure change, the estimated GSPs should represent what they GSP would have been if the rates were 
never changed. The difference between the model’s estimations and the true values are what is being used 
to account for the effect of the rate structure change. So, if given the new data, the model expected a GSP 
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of 400,000 and then the real data was 350,000 the interpretation would be that the rate change resulted in 
a 50,000 reduction in GSP that month. The estimated model has an adjusted R-squared of 0.7702 and an 
F-statistic of 23.87 (full regression statistics can be found in appendix 1). The resulting estimated model is 
as follows:  
𝐺𝑆𝑃 = (−13318.6 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑) + (0.0015347 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑) − (5335.93
∗ 𝐻𝐿𝐻𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) − (1422.59 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) + (1719.26 ∗ 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) + (0.97555
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) − (174728 ∗ 𝐽𝑎𝑛) + (252903 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑏) + (92555 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟) + (218786
∗ 𝐴𝑝𝑟) + (138568 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑦) + (362998 ∗ 𝐽𝑢𝑛) + (442078 ∗ 𝐽𝑢𝑙) + (532354 ∗ 𝐴𝑢𝑔)
+ (556824 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡) + (717400 ∗ 𝑂𝑐𝑡) + (247222 ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑣) − 10864780 
 
 The coefficients on the months are the fixed effects of each month relative to December which is 
the base case. The overall time trend was to decreasing GSPs, this is likely due to a mix of the rate change 
effect as well as conservation. Total retail load follows GSP very closely since most customers have a 
consistent load factor.  The energy and demand rates are set by BPA as monthly rates. Weather varies 
depending on how hot or cold it was, and for how long, each month. Population increases steadily each 
year. It is important to note that the demand rate should not be interpreted as customer elasticity since it is 





The model was then used to generate estimated GSP values based on real data for Oct 2011- Sept 
2014. On average the monthly GSP was 0.25 percent lower than the model estimated. While the monthly 
peaks on average dropped by 0.25 percent, the difference each month was substantially different. The 
following graph shows the average difference between the model estimations and the actual meter data 
over the three-year period (the full three years can be found in appendix 4). 
 
As shows in the graph above, the rate structure change seems to have caused peaks to increase 
from March to September and decrease from October to February. Since the winter months are the most 
expensive for BPA, and when monthly peaks are highest, this should result in net savings. Similarly, the 
difference between the winter GSPs and summer GSPs was substantially moderated. The difference 
between the highest winter GSP and lowest summer GSP in the first year (October 2011 – September 
2012) was 92 percent of what was expected by the model, in the second year it was 60 percent of what 
was expected, and in the third year it was 66 percent of what was expected. This means that while the 
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average monthly peak went barely went down, this does not tell the full story. The monthly peaks were 




 The change in rate structure did cause an average decrease to peaks. However, individual monthly 
effects varied widely. Since most of the increased months were in the summer months where demand is 
lower in general, it is unlikely that this increase will result in a substantial increase to costs for BPA. 
Alternatively, since the extremeness between valleys and peaks was reduced, it should be easier to plan 
for going forward. The model expected an average monthly deviation from the annual mean of 13.6 
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percent; but the actual average deviation was only 9.5 percent. With only three years to look at with the 
new pricing it is hard to draw strong conclusions about the persistence of winter peak reduction, but based 
on these results the best expectation is that the highest monthly peaks are lower under non-coincident 
peak pricing than they were under coincident peak pricing. 
  
Further Research 
 Having a restricted sample of only three years post rate design change to look at restricts the 
ability to draw sweeping conclusions. This research should be followed up in a few years to see if the 
effects documented here persist.  
 One substantial effect that was not accounted for in this research was conservation. Data on 
conservation is difficult to standardize but doing so would allow for better isolation of effects. It is likely 
that some of the winter peak savings shown in this study are due to better conservation in the last few 















Customers Included in Study: 
 
Alder Mutual Light Company 
Benton Rural Electric Association 
Big Bend Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Canby Utility Board 
City of Albion 
City of Ashland 
City of Bandon 
City of Blaine 
City of Bonners Ferry 
City of Burley 
City of Cascade Locks 
City of Centralia 
City of Cheney 
City of Chewelah 
City of Declo 
City of Drain 
City of Ellensburg 
City of Forest Grove 
City of Hermiston 
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City of Heyburn 
City of McCleary 
City of Milton 
City of Milton-Freewater 
City of Minidoka 
City of Monmouth 
City of Plummer 
City of Port Angeles 
City of Richland, Washington 
City of Rupert 
City of Soda Springs 
City of Sumas 
City of Troy 
Columbia Basin Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Columbia Power Cooperative Association 
Columbia River People's Utility District 
Columbia Rural Electric Association 
Consolidated Irrigation District No. 19 
East End Mutual Electric Company, LTD 
Elmhurst Mutual Power & Light Company 
Fairchild Air Force Base 
Farmers Electric Company, LTD 
Flathead Elec Coop 
Glacier Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Harney Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Hood River Electric Cooperative 
Idaho County Light & Power Cooperative Association, Inc. 
Inland Power & Light Company 
Kootenai Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Lakeview Light & Power 
Lower Valley Energy, Inc. 
McMinnville, City of 
Midstate Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Missoula Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Modern Electric Water Company 
Nespelem Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Northern Wasco County People's Utility District 
Ohop Mutual Light Company 
Orcas Power & Light Cooperative 
Oregon Trail Electric Consumers Cooperative, Inc. 
Parkland Light & Water Company 
Peninsula Light Company 
Public Utility District #1 of Skamania County 
Public Utility District No. 1 of Asotin County 
Public Utility District No. 1 of Clallam County 
Public Utility District No. 1 of Ferry County 
Public Utility District No. 1 of Kittitas County 
Public Utility District No. 1 of Mason County 
Public Utility District No. 1 of Wahkiakum County 
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Public Utility District No. 1 of Whatcom County 
Public Utility District No. 3 of Mason County 
Ravalli County Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Riverside Electric Company, LTD 
Salem Electric 
South Side Electric, Inc. 
Springfield Utility Board 
Surprise Valley Electrification Corporation 
Tanner Electric Cooperative 
Tillamook People's Utility District 
Town of Coulee Dam 
Town of Eatonville 
Town of Steilacoom 
U.S. Department of Energy - Richland Operations Office 
Umpqua Indian Utility Cooperative 
United Electric Co-op, Inc. 
US DOE Natl Energy Technology Lab 
USN Bangor 
USN Everett-Jim Creek 
Vera Water & Power 
Vigilante Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
Wasco Electric Cooperative, Inc. 




Extremeness of Weather in a month is a calculated value defined as the average of the 
Extremeness of Weather each day of the month. Extremeness of Weather for a day is defined as the sum 
of substantial cooling degree hours and substantial heating degree hours for that day. Substantial heating 
degree hours are defined as the sum of degree-hours below 65 degrees each hour of the day. Substantial 
cooling degree hours are defined as the sum of degree-hours above 75 degrees each hour of the day. In 
other words, it is the average number degree-hours above 75 and below 65 degrees Fahrenheit each day, 
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